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Abstract: Women make up a disproportionate share of the world’s poor, and Latin
America is no exception to this trend. Nevertheless, very few studies of social
policy in the region have investigated why the gendered character of welfare provision varies across countries. This article addresses that question through a comparative historical analysis of Chile and Uruguay and concludes that variation in
the gendered nature of each state’s social policy regime resulted from a two-step
process. In the first stage, female labor force participation, the mobilizing capacity of women, and policy legacies differentiated the two countries, placing Chile
on a less equitable trajectory than Uruguay. These differences were then magnified during each state’s experience under authoritarian rule.

Most scholars of economics, political science, and sociology recognize that women make up a disproportionate share of the world’s poor.
Latin America has not been immune to this trend, and a recent study
found that “nearly half of women older than fifteen years of age do not
have access to an independent income, compared to twenty percent of
men in the same age group” (ECLAC 2004, 139 [translation by author]).
Despite the clear gendered differences in Latin American poverty, analyses of the region’s welfare states2 have focused primarily on explaining
1. This paper has benefited enormously from the insightful comments of professors
and colleagues. In particular, I would like to thank Evelyne Huber and Inés Valdez, who
read and commented on multiple versions of the text. Merike Blofield, Mireya Davila,
Agustina Giraudy, Jonathan Hartlyn, Mala Htun, Juan Pablo Luna, Lars Schoultz, John
Stephens, and four anonymous reviewers also offered extremely helpful feedback on
earlier versions of the paper. Any shortcomings that remain are my own. I would also
like to acknowledge the support of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill’s
Institute for Latin American Studies and the Mellon Foundation, which funded two
months of research in Uruguay during 2003.
2. I have chosen to use this term despite clear differences between the scope of Latin
American social policy regimes and those of most advanced industrialized economies.
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differences in overall social spending levels.3 This focus has neglected
an important point of variation between Latin American welfare regimes:
the gendered character of social policy. This paper aims to fill this hole
in the literature. Through a comparative analysis of Chile and Uruguay,
the following pages explore how and why Latin American countries
vary in their abilities to formulate policy that responds to the unique
social risks that women face.
The design of social policy regimes has a profound impact on women’s
material well-being as well as on the formation of societal definitions of
a woman’s role as a citizen, worker, and caregiver. While some welfare
regimes reproduce traditional gender roles, other systems provide
women with opportunities to reduce their dependency on both the market and the family. Additionally, some welfare regimes are able to address the specific social risks women face more effectively than others,
producing lower levels of female poverty and male-female wage dispersion and higher levels of female labor-force participation. Finally,
welfare systems can influence gender equity through the quality and
coverage of education, because improving women’s access to schooling
provides them with better and higher-paying jobs.4
Ensuring equal social protection for women is important for many
reasons. First, there is the normative expectation that democratic regimes
will grant equal rights to all citizens regardless of sex, race, age, etc.
Secondly, reducing women’s exposure to risk is important for reversing
recent growth in poverty and inequality in Latin America. The Chilean
government estimates that between 1990 and 1996, 19.5 percent of households escaped poverty because of female entry into the labor force
(ECLAC, 2000a, 51).
The comparison of Chile and Uruguay is useful because similarities
between the two countries, (level of economic development, history with
democracy, and stability of the party system) allow me to control for a
number of rival hypotheses. More importantly, the case selection provides special insight into the issue of gender and welfare because Chile
and Uruguay have similar levels of social spending, yet markedly different policy outcomes.5 While the Chilean welfare state is an example
3. Examples include Brown and Hunter (1999); Dion (2001); Huber (1996); Kaufman
and Segura (2001).
4. According to the United Nations Development Program (2004), the combined primary,
secondary, and tertiary school enrollment rates for men and women in Uruguay is 81 and 90
percent respectively. In Chile, those same figures are 80 and 79 percent respectively.
5. The two countries spent approximately 7 percent of GDP on health and education
in 1999. Chile and Uruguay’s spending patterns do differ with regard to social security
and welfare expenditure (with Chile spending approximately 8 percent of GDP while
Uruguay spends 19 percent) (Huber et al. 2006). Still, both countries are among the top
four spenders in the region and have similarly long traditions of welfare policy.
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of a gender-biased regime, Uruguay’s social policies exhibit greater gender neutrality.6 The findings of the paper suggest that gendered variation between Chile and Uruguay’s welfare states results from a two-step
process. In the first stage, female labor force participation, the mobilizing capacity of women, and policy legacies differentiated the two countries, placing Chile on a less equitable trajectory than Uruguay. These
differences were then magnified during each state’s experience under
authoritarian rule.
NEW RISKS AND NEW WELFARE: WHAT ARE THE ISSUES?

The traditional welfare state seeks to protect workers against risks
encountered in the market, namely the loss of income due to unemployment, sickness, disability, and old age. In recent decades, however, new
risks have emerged alongside traditional issues. In Latin America, these
new risks include the shrinking of the formal sector and subsequent
growth of the unregulated informal market and dramatic changes in the
family structure. Women have been particularly affected by the emergence of these new risks because of their dual dependency on the family
and the market. Indeed, changes in family structure, namely a rising
divorce rate and an increase in single-parent households, typically run
by women, have increased women’s exposure to risk.
In conjunction with this shift away from the traditional family structure, the composition of the Chilean and Uruguayan labor-force has experienced a dramatic transformation in recent years. Women have
increasingly moved out of unpaid domestic work and into the formal
and informal labor markets in both countries, although to a lesser degree in Chile. At the same time, unemployment has increased and international competition has resulted in a reduction of low-skill jobs.
As a result, many workers have been forced into the informal sector,
which is defined as “all income-earning activities that are not regulated
by the state” (Portes and Schauffler 1993, 6). ECLAC (2002) estimates
that as many as 50 percent of Latin American workers in urban centers
function in the informal sector (195–196). Because of the low-skill nature of much informal work and the flexibility that it offers, women are
more likely to engage in it than men. Contreras (2003) finds that 44.8
percent of working-aged women in Chile functioned in the informal
sector in 1998, while only 32.9 percent of men worked informally (60–
64). A 2004 ECLAC study suggests that this same gendered division of
6. This does not imply that Uruguay has a perfect record on gendered rights. Indeed,
women’s organizations have criticized the government for being slow to implement
portions of the United Nations’ Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Cladem n.d.).
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informal sector employment exists in Uruguay (162). In response to the
emergence of these new social risks, citizens have, in some cases, urged
politicians to respond with policy innovations. Chile and Uruguay have
varied in their ability to address the risks faced by women. I now turn to
assessing this variation.
A GENDERED ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL POLICY: BREADWINNER VERSUS CITIZEN WELFARE

The dependent variable of this study is the gendered nature of each
country’s welfare regime. To measure this, I modify Sainsbury’s (1996)
framework of two “ideal type” welfare regimes: the male breadwinner
and the citizen model. The male breadwinner ideal type is characterized by unequal provision of benefits and entitlements that are grounded
in an individual’s position in the labor market and/or family. The citizen welfare state, on the other hand, provides universal protection regardless of an individual’s sex and status in the market.
For the purpose of this article, Sainsbury’s framework is more useful
than those developed by Orloff (1993), O’Conner, Orloff, and Shaver
(1999), or Fraser (1996) for several reasons. First, Sainsbury’s categorization permits an analysis of individual policy sectors. This is not the case
for Orloff’s framework, which contains dimensions that assess the overall character of the (full) welfare state. Similarly, Orloff, O’Conner, and
Shaver are explicit in focusing their analysis on each country’s total policy
regime (12). It is clear, therefore, that the focus of Orloff and Orloff,
O’Conner, and Shaver’s work is broader than the scope of this article.
Likewise, Fraser’s framework, which focuses on seven principles of
gendered equality, is also intended for analyses of the entire welfare
state. Sainsbury’s framework, by contrast, provides dimensions that can
be used to measure individual policy sectors. Furthermore, the specification of clear and identifiable elements in Sainsbury’s framework allows for a systematic comparison.7
Sainsbury’s framework was developed for the analysis of advanced
industrialized welfare states, and must be modified for research on Latin
American social policy. Unlike in advanced industrialized democracies,
the dichotomous distinction between breadwinner and citizen welfare
regimes is not useful for analyses of Latin America because no state in
the region provides citizen-style welfare. Rather, Latin American social
policy tends to vary with regard to the strength of the breadwinner
model. For this reason, it is more useful to employ Sainsbury’s dimensions but evaluate policies with regard to the relative “strength of bread7. For the purpose of this argument, I have omitted five of Sainsbury’s dimensions:
familial ideology, the tax system, the unit of contribution, employment and wage policies, and caring work (paid or unpaid).
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winner” instead of classifying programs as “breadwinner” or “citizen.”
I use four of Sainsbury’s nine analytic categories. The first dimension of
the framework is welfare entitlement, which refers to what social rights
are available to citizens. In some social policy regimes the rights of
women and men differ with regard to the level and type of benefit, while
in other cases no distinction is made between the sexes. The second dimension of Sainsbury’s framework is the basis of entitlement, or the means
by which individuals gain access to welfare transfers and services. I also
analyze the recipient of the benefit, which allows for an assessment of
women’s access to welfare programs vis-à-vis their male counterparts.
The final dimension of Sainsbury’s framework is the unit of benefit, which
describes who (what risk group) the welfare program targets.
To determine the strength of the breadwinner model in Chile and
Uruguay, I analyze three policy sectors: family allowances, childcare,
and maternity leave. I have chosen to limit my focus to three areas for
two reasons. First, the space of a paper will not permit an analysis of the
full welfare state. Furthermore, the three policy areas are similar in that
each program seeks to address the dual demands that women face in
acting as caregivers and workers. In this way, the policy domains provide a good assessment of each state’s ability to reduce women’s dependence on the market and the family.
In the following section I discuss each policy area, evaluating the program along the lines of Sainsbury’s four dimensions. This discussion is
summarized in table 1.
Family Allowances
Chile and Uruguay both offer family allowances to impoverished
families. In Chile, men and women have access to family allowances,
but the entitlement requirements are not equal across the sexes. Chilean
men and women qualify for the allowance if they have dependent children under the age of eighteen (or twenty-four if in school). The entitlement changes, however, with regard to the spouse’s status. Men qualify
for a family allowance if they have dependent wives, but women only
receive an allowance if their husbands are disabled (U.S. Social Security
Administration 1999, 77, 378). Put differently, working women in Chile
do not receive the same level of family allowance benefits as working
men. The Uruguayan family allowance system does not make this distinction, but rather pays a set amount for each dependent regardless of
the head of household’s sex.
The family allowance systems in Chile and Uruguay also differ with
regard to the basis of entitlement. In Chile, allowances are available to
“employed persons and pensioners with one or more children or other
eligible dependents” (U.S. Social Security Administration 1999, 77), while

WOMEN AND WELFARE IN CHILE AND URUGUAY

89

Table 1 Summary of Policy Classification
Chile

Uruguay

Entitlement

Unequal across sexes

Equal across sexes

Basis of Entitlement

Extremely limited
(must be formally
employed and with
contract).

More inclusive (larger
number of work
categories and no
contract limitation).

Recipient of Benefits

Head of household

Head of household

Unit of Benefit

Family

Family

Overall Breadwinner

Strong breadwinner

Weak breadwinner

Entitlement

Unequal across sexes

Unequal across sexes

Basis of Entitlement

Limited (same limits
as family allowances)

More inclusive (more
job categories and
recently unemployed
women are covered).

Recipient of Benefits

Mother

Mother

Unit of Benefit

Household

Household

Overall Breadwinner

Strong breadwinner

Breadwinner

Entitlement

Unequal across sexes

Equal across sexes

Basis of Entitlement

Very limited (must be
formal sector worker
with a contract)

More inclusive (no job
is required; targeting is
based on family
income) preschool
program is universal
and therefore
completely inclusive

Recipient of Benefits

Working mother

Any household
member who
demonstrates need.

Unit of Benefit

Family

Family

Overall Breadwinner

Breadwinner

Weak breadwinner

Overall Regime Type

Strong breadwinner

Weak breadwinner

Family Allowances

Maternity Leave

Childcare
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in Uruguay the benefit is extended to a wider range of individuals: “employed persons, domestic workers, persons in receipt of unemployment
benefits, newspaper and small rural products vendors, and pensioners”
(U.S. Social Security Administration 1999, 377). This diversity of entitlement base provides Uruguayan women with better access to family allowances, since many domestic workers and small vendors are female.
Additionally, in 2004 Uruguay passed a law extending coverage of family allowances to all households with incomes of less than three times
the minimum wage, including those headed by individuals working in
the informal sector (Uruguay, Presidencia de la República 2004), where
it is estimated that women are overrepresented. Incorporating these categories of workers into the entitlement base boosts women’s access to
the benefit in Uruguay.
Another factor that negatively affects Chilean women’s ability to secure access to family allowances (and all labor-based welfare transfers)
is the county’s two-tiered employment system, which grants social welfare benefits to some workers, while denying them to others. Chilean
workers who are subject to contract have access to all labor-market-based
welfare benefits, while individuals who are paid on a boleta, or a receipt,
do not enjoy the same privileges. It is important to note that boleta workers are formal sector employees, but their status is less than that of contracted workers.
Access to fully contracted work is diminishing in Chile, while the boleta
system has become more prevalent. Between 1996 and 2000, the percentage of all salaried workers with contracts decreased from 80 to 77 percent
for men and from 78 to 72 percent for women (De la Luz Trautmann 2002).
Furthermore, high-income earners are much more likely to have a contract than low-income individuals. In 2000, 86.5 percent of females working in the formal sector with earnings in the top income quintile were
contracted laborers, while only 39.7 percent of women in the bottom income quintile had contracts. Additionally, the gap between the number of
men and women who have contracts is largest among the poor. In 2000,
the difference in contract coverage between male and female workers in
the top income quintile was 1.5 percentage points, while in the bottom
income quintile, the difference in coverage was 18.6 percentage points (De
la Luz Trautmann 2002). It is clear, therefore, that a large proportion of
low-income women are employed through the boleta system rather than
by contract. This means that very few poor women have access to welfare
benefits even when they work in the formal labor force.8
8. The Chilean state provides a limited number of means-tested family allowances to
households that do not qualify for the employment-based system. Nonetheless, this
benefit is separate from the primary family allowance program and thus I do not include it in the analysis.
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The recipient of the family allowance benefit in both the Chilean and Uruguayan case is the head of household (U.S. Social Security Administration
1999, 77, 378). Additionally, the unit of benefit in both cases is the family
rather than the individual (ibid.). On these two dimensions, therefore, the
two countries exhibit similar levels of breadwinner strength. In summary,
both Chile and Uruguay offer family allowances to needy families, but the
programs differ in important ways. In Chile, family allowances are unequal
across the sexes, and the basis of entitlement is limited because of the segmented nature of the labor market. In Uruguay, by contrast, men and women
are provided with equal benefits and the system has been expanded to offer protection to a broader portion of the population.
Childcare
The Chilean government created a system of subsidized childcare in
1994. The recipients of this benefit are working mothers who qualify
through the country’s socioeconomic targeting scheme. To qualify, the
household must score no more than a minimum number of points on
the targeting survey and the mother must show an employment contract and proof of working hours (Clert and Wodon 2001, 60). In this
way, the basis of entitlement to Chile’s childcare program is restricted along
two dimensions: an individual’s labor market position and household
income. The system, therefore, excludes four groups of potential beneficiaries: women whose household income exceeds the minimal target
amount, women working in the informal sector, women looking for
work, and women who are employed, but not by contract. As I have
previously demonstrated, low-income women who work in the formal
sector are unlikely to be employed by contract.
Uruguay also provides a form of state-subsidized childcare to a small
group of low-income families. Beginning in the 1930s, but expanding
dramatically during the 1980s and 1990s, the Uruguayan state developed neighborhood-based Infant and Family Attention Centers (CAIF).
The aim of CAIF is to “improve the well-being, level of development,
and social insertion of families in high socioeconomic risk groups through
nutrition programs, health attention, education, and family assistance”
(Midaglia 2000, 63 [translation by author]). Childcare was not a focus of
the CAIF program originally, but with time, the centers have begun to
function as a form of daycare. CAIFs operate during the workday, and
according to the staff, many women use the service as a form of childcare
(Midaglia 2000).
While successful, the CAIF program is limited in scope.9 The most
common complaint about the centers is that many families do not have
9. I was unable to find official estimates of program coverage.
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access to the service. Indeed, one-third of CAIF centers report having a
waiting list that represents 60 percent of its current coverage (Midaglia
2000, 67). The government uses a targeting scheme to determine which
families have access to CAIFs. The targeting method relies on family
income and the age of children in the household. Families with children
under four and pregnant and nursing women receive priority (Midaglia
2000, 68). The effectiveness of this targeting method is buttressed by the
fact that centers only operate in low-income neighborhoods and provide services to individuals living in the community. Women are not
required to show proof of employment to access the service, and therefore females in the informal sector and individuals looking for work are
able to use the childcare services. The CAIF targeting scheme is efficient
at providing services to Uruguay’s poorest families. An estimated 80.7
percent of CAIF services are used by the lowest 20 percent of income
earners. The remaining 19.3 percent of users are from the second-poorest income quintile (Murrugarra 2000, 23).
In addition to the CAIF system, Uruguayan parents benefit from a de
facto form of daycare that the country’s near-universal preschool program provides. Uruguay’s 1995 education reform instituted a system of
universal public preschool for children between the ages of three and
five. The preschool classes are held during the normal school/work day,
and therefore, the program serves as an unofficial form of daycare for
many parents. Coverage of the preschool program is extremely high. In
2001, the enrollment of three year olds was 39 percent, while attendance
by four year olds was 72 percent. Enrollment figures for five-year-old
children are the most impressive, with approximately 91 percent attending preschool (Anep-Codicen 2002).10
In summary, entitlement to childcare services in Uruguay is equal across
the sexes, as both men and women can obtain access to CAIF programs
and enroll children in preschool, thus securing a de facto form of daycare.
The universal nature of preschool education and the progressive targeting system used for the CAIF program provide a more inclusive basis of
entitlement to childcare than that which exists in Chile’s childcare system. The unit of benefit in both Chile and Uruguay is the family, but the
recipient of benefits varies across the two cases with women receiving the
subsidy in Chile, while both men and women receive it in Uruguay. For
all of these reasons, I have scored Chile’s childcare system as a breadwinner model and Uruguay’s program as a weak breadwinner type.

10. Chile also provides public preschool, but the coverage is limited with only about
32 percent of children between three months and five years of age attending preschool
(data from author interview with Silvia Belmar, Santiago, Chile, August 12, 2005).
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Maternity Leave
Both Chile and Uruguay offer paid maternity leave to women working
in the formal sector. In Chile, women with work contracts have the right
to six weeks leave before and twelve weeks after the birth of the child. In
Uruguay, the leave is six weeks before and six weeks after the birth of the
child. Both countries provide women with 100 percent of their salary during the time of leave (U.S. Social Security Administration 1999; Servicio
Nacional de la Mujer n.d.). Additionally, Chile grants women a one-hour
feeding break each day until the child is two years old, while Uruguay
provides the break only until the child is six months old (Abramo 2002, 3).
At first glance, the Chilean system seems to be more generous than the
Uruguayan system, offering greater flexibility for women to enter and exit
the labor force, but many female workers are denied access to the benefit
because of the two-tiered employment system.
Entitlement to the maternity leave benefit is differentiated between
spouses in both the Chilean and Uruguayan case. Neither country provides for the possibility of men taking paternity leave, as is the case in
some advanced-industrialized welfare states. Both countries, therefore,
should be considered breadwinner models with regard to entitlement to
maternity leave. The basis of the entitlement in both cases is also strongly
breadwinner in design. Neither country offers financial support to pregnant women who have never been attached to the labor market. Uruguay,
however, does provide a broader entitlement base. Rights to the maternity allowance are extended to self-employed individuals as well as to
women receiving unemployment benefits (U.S. Social Security Administration 1999, 376). This is important because it provides protection to
women who have recently lost jobs, a right that does not exist in the Chilean system. Furthermore, it should again be noted that in Chile the entitlement base is greatly reduced by the fact that only contract workers are
eligible for maternity leave. The unit of benefit and the recipient of the benefit
is the household in both Chile and Uruguay and therefore both countries
should be considered breadwinner on those dimensions.
This analysis of Chile’s and Uruguay’s family allowance, childcare,
and maternity leave policies suggests that there are important differences between the two countries with regard to the gendered nature of
welfare programs. Indeed, while Chile’s system is representative of a
very strong breadwinner model, Uruguayan policy demonstrates weaker
breadwinner tendencies. Table 1 provides a summary of the crossnational differences on each of the four dimensions considered in this
analysis. One aspect that emerges from the table is that the majority of
variation between Chile and Uruguay is rooted in differences in program entitlements and in the basis of entitlement. While Chilean policy
tends to be unequal across the sexes and very limited in coverage
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because of the large number of informal or boleta workers, Uruguay offers more equal benefits to men and women and has worked to expand
the basis of entitlement so as to create more universalistic programs.
AN EXPLANATION OF GENDERED DIFFERENCES

Differences in the gender friendliness of Chile’s and Uruguay’s social policy regimes are best explained in terms of a two-step process.
Pre-1973 gendered variation between the two countries’ social policy
regimes resulted from differences in the evolution of each state’s labor
market, the mobilizing capacity of women, and characteristics of the
party system. Specifically, the evolution of each country’s labor market
affected women’s mobilizing capacity, which in turn influenced the ideological and gendered distribution of power within the country. Women’s
ability to shift the gendered distribution of power was also conditioned
by characteristics of the party system. As societal attitudes about gender shifted in response to women’s growing power, constraints on
gendered and nongendered social policy formation loosened. The policies that emerged from this process (both gendered and nongendered),
fed a feedback mechanism that reshaped aspects of the labor market and
the context in which women’s mobilization was carried out, creating a
“virtuous cycle” in Uruguay and a disadvantageous cycle in Chile.
Although this virtuous cycle explains initial gendered differences
between Chile and Uruguay, a second step is required to understand
contemporary variation between the two states’ welfare regimes. Indeed,
although gendered differences existed between the two countries in the
early to mid-twentieth century, the gap widened during Chile’s and
Uruguay’s military regimes. The Chilean government’s adoption of orthodox neoliberal economic reforms, coupled with the junta’s ability to
further entrench ideological and institutional constraints on genderfriendly policy making, had a profound impact on the gendered character of Chile’s post-authoritarian welfare state. Uruguay’s dictatorship,
by contrast, was less orthodox with regard to economic policy and was
unable to institutionalize protections for conservative factions of the
country’s traditional political parties.11
Structural Labor Market Conditions
The starting point for conceptualizing variation in Chile’s and
Uruguay’s gendered social policy outcomes is the difference in women’s
labor market participation. As displayed in table 2, Uruguayan women

11. See Castiglioni (2005) for a full analysis of these differences.
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Table 2 Female Labor Force Participation, Select Years (Percent)
Chile
Level
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000

19.7
18.1
20.4
25.4
31.4

Uruguay
Change

Level

Change

-1.6
2.3
5
6

24.2
26.2
32.4
40
44.1

2
6.2
7.6
4.1

Source: ECLAC (various years) Statistical Yearbook.

entered the formal work force at a much faster pace than Chilean
women.12 Although female involvement in the labor market has grown
throughout the world during the past seventy-five years, the trend was
likely intensified in Uruguay because of the high demand for labor. Historically, the country’s small population and highly urbanized context
created a strong demand for workers, thus providing Uruguayan women
with unique opportunities denied to their Chilean counterparts.
As Uruguayan women gained increased access to the labor market,
they obtained a new level of political relevance. One way that female
labor market participation increased women’s political clout was through
unionization. Unions facilitate mass mobilization by providing individuals with organizational infrastructure and a direct channel through which
to access the political/policy-making process. In this way, women’s involvement in Uruguayan trade unions propelled female demands into
the political arena. Ensignia and Yáñez (1999) note differences in the
level of female unionization in Chile and Uruguay, arguing that the greatest barriers to women’s participation in these groups are found in Chile
(20). In Uruguay, by contrast, the authors note that women have made
several important achievements such as the creation of the Tripartite
Commission for Equal Opportunity and a special Women’s Job Training
Division in the Labor Ministry (62).13
The fact that Uruguayan women entered the labor market and began
to organize themselves earlier than Chilean women marked an important difference between the two countries. Similarly, as Uruguayan
women began to earn an independent income, they increased their
economic power and mobility. In Chile, by contrast, low levels of female
12. Female labor force participation is the percentage of all women between the ages
of fifteen and sixty-five who are active in the formal labor market. I could find no comparable data that predates 1960.
13. I was unable to find historical figures on women’s unionization in Chile and Uruguay. However, evidence from Alma Espino and Paola Azar (2004) and Chile’s Servicio
Nacional de la Mujer (online database, n.d.), suggests that women’s involvement in Uruguayan trade unions in the 1990s was five percentage points higher than in Chile.
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labor force participation hindered the organizational and economic resources that women possessed to issue policy demands.
Women’s Mobilization, Political Parties, and Policy Legacies
Different levels of female labor market participation in Chile and Uruguay, in turn, shaped the gendered distribution of power in each country.
Changes in the power distribution were not automatic, but resulted from
the mobilization of women’s interests. Uruguayan women in the second
half of the twentieth century built on a strong tradition of mobilization.
Indeed, by 1916, Uruguayan women’s groups had demonstrated their
growing economic and political power. Female workers founded the National Women’s Council, which organized meetings and protests to demand voting rights. Although Uruguayan women were not granted
suffrage until 1932, the Communist Party began efforts to incorporate
women into the political organization in the 1920s (Garrido 2000, 149).
The Communist Party was not alone in its desire to attract women to the
party base, and in 1931 the Colorado Party created the Batllista Feminist
Committee, which provided women with unique access to political resources (Garrido 2000, 149). Although Chile also had an active women’s
suffrage movement, the suffrage groups’ ties to political parties were not
as strong, which limited their long-term mobilizing capacity. Evidence of
the differential political clout enjoyed by women in both countries is seen
in the fact that Chilean women won the right to vote in national elections
in 1949, seventeen years after their Uruguayan counterparts.
Variation in the level of women’s incorporation into political parties
in Chile and Uruguay is in part explained by the level of female mobilization in each state, but is also conditioned by the character of both countries’ party systems. Indeed, the Uruguayan party system, which at that
time was composed of two catchall parties with factions that spanned
the full ideological spectrum, provided unique incentives for the early
incorporation of women because the elite sectors of the country were
politically divided between the two parties. The existence of a divided
and electorally-oriented elite that monopolized access to state-resources
to furnish incentives to their constituencies, induced parties to seek the
incorporation of subordinated groups, such as women, as a way to widen
their electoral bases and institutionalize their support (Luna 2005). In
Chile, the same situation did not occur, and pressures to extend voting
rights emerged only after outsider parties entered the system (Luna 2005).
More importantly for this paper, however, the evolution of the Chilean
party system involved the emergence in the 1930s of a strong Christian
Democratic Party (The Partido Demócrata Cristiano [PDC]). The party
is important because its strength imposed ideological constraints on the
formation of gender-friendly policy in Chile.
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Differences between Christian Democratic welfare policies and those
of secular left parties have been widely researched in the literature on
European welfare states. These differences exist in both gendered and
nongendered terms.14 Esping-Andersen (1999) argues that Christian
Democratic welfare regimes in Europe tend to be “familialistic” because
the regimes are “influenced by Catholic social teachings and the principle of subsidiarity: limiting public interference to situations where
primary social networks—read family—fail” (51). This resistance on the
part of Christian Democratic parties to allow for state involvement in
the private sphere leads to noninterventionist family and social policy
(Van Kersbergen 1995, 187–191). Such noninterventionist policy has negative consequences for gendered outcomes because without altering the
traditional family structure, it is difficult to reduce women’s dependency.
Chile’s experience under Christian Democratic rule (during both the preand post-authoritarian periods) corroborates findings from research on
European welfare states. In Uruguay, by contrast, the role of the PDC
has been much less notable. Uruguay’s PDC was formed in 1962 following a political division within the Catholic-based party, Unión Cívica
(Mainwaring and Scully 2003, 49). The party went on to help found the
leftist coalition of parties, the Frente Amplio (FA), but never became a
strong electoral force.
While Chile and Uruguay’s party systems did generate divergent
opportunity structures for feminist organizations, it must be noted that
women’s mobilization (or lack thereof) had an independent effect on
gendered policy outcomes as well. Lavrin (1995) finds support for this
fact, noting that women activists and public health officials were the
driving force behind legislative achievements that increased protection
for female workers in the early twentieth century (87). In the case of
Uruguay, women’s growing political power resulted in Jose Batlle y
Ordóñez’s 1906 proposal of a pre- and post-natal leave law, which was
expanded by subsequent Colorado legislative proposals in 1908, 1911,
and 1913. Similar legislation did not emerge in Chile until 1919, and
even then, the measures represented a more conservative effort to protect women. Lavrin (1995) notes that in the early to mid-twentieth century, “Chile lagged behind Argentina and Uruguay in protective [labor]
legislation [for women and children]” (77).
Uruguay’s “virtuous cycle” of increased political power was not
matched in Chile. As demonstrated in table two, female labor force participation in Chile has been consistently lower than in Uruguay, thus
hampering women’s access to a structured space (the workplace) within
which to organize interests and develop power resources. The slow
movement of women into the labor force complicated the efforts by
14. See Huber, Ragin, and Stephens (1993); and Van Kersbergen (1995).
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Chilean feminist groups to shift the gendered balance of power within
society. Evidence of this fact is seen in the passage of conservative legislation aimed at blocking women’s employment in the mid-1930s. Indeed, at the same time that Uruguayan women were securing greater
job safety, Chilean president Arturo Alessandri supported a bill to restrict women’s employment in government and municipal offices and
to limit minimum wage rights to male workers (Lavrin 1995, 94).
This particular historical incident serves as a good example of the importance of female actors and women’s mobilization in securing more
equitable social policy. In Chile, where women had limited access to work,
and thus exerted weaker mobilizing capacity, women were unable to resist the gender-regressive policy of President Alessandri. At the same time
in Uruguay, reports of weak enforcement of a law aimed at protecting
female workers prompted one of the country’s first female deputies to
mobilize legislative support for the creation of a new department in the
National Labor Office that was dedicated to supervising women and youth
working conditions (Lavrin 1995, 84). In short, women’s mobilizing capacity mattered in both positive and negative terms for the fate of gendered
social policy formation in both Chile and Uruguay.
In addition to the slow entry of women into the labor force, several
characteristics of Chile’s women’s movement, namely the existence of
sharp class divisions and a hesitation to enter the policy-making sphere,
have also undermined groups’ capacity to mobilize support for genderfriendly policies and alter societal preferences about gender roles. In her
work on the Chilean women’s movement, Baldez (2002) argues that historically, a good deal of Chilean women’s mobilization has unfolded
outside the traditional (state) policy making sphere (10–15). Indeed, despite an abundance of organizations, Chilean women’s groups largely
engaged in activities outside the realm of state politics and, therefore,
did not enjoy institutionalized access to the policy-making domain.
The Legacy of Authoritarianism: Neoliberal Social Policy and Ideological
Constraints
Differences in female labor force participation and women’s mobilizing
capacity worked in conjunction with aspects of each country’s party system
to generate gendered differences in Chile and Uruguay’s welfare states in
the early to mid-twentieth century. This variation widened during each
country’s respective military rule because the authoritarian regimes that took
hold in Chile and Uruguay in 1973 were different in style and scope and
therefore generated divergent regime legacies. Specifically, while the Uruguayan dictatorship was unable to dismantle the country’s welfare state,
Chile’s military junta engaged in a dramatic process of economic liberalization, privatizing and eliminating several welfare programs (Castiglioni 2005).
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Upon consolidating its power, the Chilean military junta enacted a strict
process of liberalization and cost containment, dismantling many of the
country’s social welfare programs. The result was dramatic growth in
poverty and income inequality. The Gini index grew from 47.4 in 1971 to
58.5 in 1990. Similarly, the share of households living in poverty grew from
17 percent in 1970 to 39 percent in 1987 (Huber et al. 2006). Although Gen.
Augusto Pinochet’s liberalizing project was not explicitly gendered, the
reforms had gendered consequences. This is because the welfare state that
remained following Chile’s dictatorship was a residual means-tested regime, which used targeting as the primary mechanism for addressing social risk (Clert and Wodon 2001). The high levels of poverty and inequality,
the introduction of the two-tiered labor market,15 and use of targeted social spending, undermined the sense of shared fate that Chilean women
possessed prior to the dictatorship. The loss of this sense of shared fate
destroyed the cross-class character of Chile’s pro-welfare coalition, hindering the ability of many sectors of society, including the women’s movement, to mobilize and present unified pro-welfare demands. In this way,
divisions that existed in the women’s movement prior to 1973 grew more
dramatic in the wake of the dictatorship. Baldez (2002) notes that one source
of conflict within the women’s movement was that popular sector organizers perceived that gender issues were being favored over problems of
class and redistribution (183–188).
Indeed, feminist mobilization has been weak since the return to democracy. Ríos Tobar (2004) argues that inter-movement divisions and
institutional characteristics of the center-left Concertación coalition governments have debilitated the women’s movement and undermined the
political force of feminism (119). One source of division and dissent
within the women’s movement is Chile’s continuing high level of income inequality (Blofield 2006). The military regime also influenced
women’s mobilization by consolidating the power of technocrats within
the Chilean political process (Montecinos 1998). Technocratic politics,
which have continued to thrive in Chile since the transition, disadvantage women’s groups by limiting their access to the policy-making domain while privileging the access of business and economic groups
(Montecinos 1998, 105).
Unlike Chile, the maintenance of relatively universal social policy in
Uruguay has generated low levels of income inequality.16 Greater equality has strengthened the cross-class nature of Uruguay’s pro-welfare
coalition. In addition to strengthening the pro-welfare coalition, low
15. See previous discussion of the boleta system for an explanation of this policy.
16. Uruguay’s Gini index has been steady around 40 since the 1980s. This is much
lower than Chile, which had an average Gini of 58.5 in the 1990s. Chile’s Gini has remained above 55 since the democratic transition (Huber et al. 2006).
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levels of income inequality have provided a stable base for women’s
mobilization. From its very inception, the Uruguayan welfare state has
benefited all classes of women. Ehrick (2001) notes that both middleand lower-class women benefited from Batllismo and were therefore
invested in its protection and expansion (138–139). In short, the multiclass
nature of the Uruguayan welfare state provided middle- and lower-class
women with a sense of linked fate, which has in turn facilitated a united
mobilization of gendered demands.17
The virtuous cycle that accounted for initial differences between Chile
and Uruguay has continued in the wake of the authoritarian regime.
Following the transition back to democracy, Uruguayan women have
continued to create organizational spaces within political parties and
labor unions to advance their interests. As a result, an equal opportunity employment law was approved in 1989 and further expanded upon
in 1999. These laws granted women additional rights and facilitated
greater entry into the labor market, which further intensified women’s
mobilization and allowed for additional alterations in the gendered distribution of power. This process has moved forward largely because of
women’s activity in civil society groups and political parties. Although
moves to incorporate women into parties began with the Colorados in
the 1930s, recent attempts to secure the female vote have been made by
the center-left Frente Amplio (FA) and Nuevo Espacio (NE) coalitions
(Laurnaga 2001, 2).
Uruguayan women have also been elected to congressional offices
and appointed to ministerial posts. In March 2000, female deputies in
Uruguay’s Congress banded together to create a formal women’s bancada,
or legislative coalition. The group’s primary aim is to promote legislation that expands women’s rights (Garrido 2000, 151). Thus far, the coalition of female legislators has pushed a bill through the House of
Deputies that would legalize additional forms of abortion.18 The bancada
also introduced debate over the adoption of a legislative quota system
for women. Although these policy initiatives have subsequently been
paralyzed, the mere existence of a formal alliance of progressive female
politicians provides Uruguayan women with a channel to pursue demands for more equal social rights. While the simple presence of women
in government does not ensure increased representation of women’s
rights and feminist issues (Htun and Jones 2002, 52), in the case of Uruguay the presence of the bancada has, at the very least, opened a space
17. It is interesting to note that Uruguay’s feminist movement emerged simultaneous
to the expansion of the country’s welfare state. This differs from Chile and may explain
differences in the nature of each country’s women’s movement (Ehrick 2001).
18. Some forms of abortion, such as therapeutic abortion, are already legal in Uruguay. The same is not true in Chile, where all forms of abortion are illegal.
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for the discussion of issues that had previously gone unaddressed. This
is likely because the formation of the bancada goes beyond a descriptive (quota-based) representation of females in Congress; rather, the
group was formed with the stated aim of promoting women’s interests.
In Chile, by contrast, female deputies have not been able to form a
similar coalition, despite their presence in both the congress and in ministerial positions.
Very different ideological constraints also accounted for historical
differences in the gendered character of Chile and Uruguay’s welfare
regimes. While the Uruguayan party system divided elite interests and
encouraged the early enfranchisement of women, the Chilean system
did not. Further, the relative strength of the right and of the PDC also
influenced Chile’s early gendered social policy outcomes. These constraints on gender-friendly policy were further strengthened during and
immediately following Pinochet’s government. In Uruguay, by contrast,
the traditional Church and the right have been weaker and were not
strengthened by the military dictatorship, which if anything undermined
the legitimacy of conservative actors.
The constraints that resulted from the strength of Chile’s rightist parties have been present throughout the country’s history, but the military
regime strengthened these forces by adding institutional protections to
the 1980 constitution, which safeguarded the representation of elite conservative interests through the creation of the binomial electoral system
and the appointment of “senators for life.”19 In Chile’s binomial electoral system, citizens elect two representatives per district. The first seat
is awarded to the candidate who wins the largest number of votes. In
order to secure the second seat, however, the winning coalition must
garner twice as many votes as the opposing party alliance. In this way,
the system favors minority parties or coalitions that might not otherwise win a seat. In practice this has offered protection to the parties of
the right since the transition to democracy. The constitutional provision
for lifetime senators also ensured special representation for conservative groups, because the rules for assigning these positions favored
former allies of the military regime. The presence of institutionalized
protection for Chile’s rightist parties and organizations is significant
because it has helped the conservative alliance block the creation and
reform of several gender-friendly social policy proposals (Blofield 2006).
Chile’s military regime also influenced the strength and the ability of
the traditional Catholic Church to impose ideological constraints on social policy making. Since the return to democracy, the Church has maintained both direct and indirect involvement in the political arena. The
19. In 2005 the Chilean constitution was reformed to eliminate the senator for life
provision.
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Church’s direct power is largely derived from its role in the country’s
democratic transition. Proof of this fact is provided by Htun’s (2003)
study, which demonstrates that cooperation between Church actors and
anti-Pinochet groups at the time of the transition secured an important
role for the Church in postauthoritarian politics (107).
The Church also exerts power in Chilean policy making through the
PDC. Since Chile’s return to democracy, the Concertación has controlled
the government. The Concertación is a coalition of center-left parties: the
PDC, the Party for Democracy (PPD), the Socialist Party (PS), and
the smaller Radical Social Democratic Party (PRSD). Prior to the 2000 parliamentary elections, the PDC was the dominant force in the coalition and
the single largest party in Chile (Huneeus 2003, 146). While the coalition
between the PDC and other secular-left parties creates a situation of unlikely bedfellows, the parties have preserved the partnership because of
incentives presented by the electoral system. As Carey (1997) notes, the
importance of political coalitions in contemporary Chilean politics has
created a situation in which “coalition leaders negotiate candidate nominations jointly and can impose discipline across all members of the coalition” (93). The strength of the PDC within the Concertación and this
discipline across party lines is important for understanding gendered differences in Chilean social policy, because the traditional character of the
party makes it particularly resistant to policies that acknowledge changes
in family structure and in the role of women. Noting that legislation related to women’s rights in the 1990–2002 period was most successful when
it did not reshape conventional views of women and the family, Blofield
and Haas (2005) argue that “the Christian Democratic party has publicly
expressed its recognition of women’s inequality, but at the same time, the
party is hesitant to introduce legislation on issues that will bring it into
conflict with the Church” (14).
Since the return to democracy in Uruguay, by contrast, the PDC has
remained weak. Although the party was one of the original founders of
the FA (Martínez Barahona 2001, 525), by 1989 some members of
Uruguay’s PDC abandoned the FA to join the slightly more moderate
NE (Mainwaring and Scully 2003, 49). Although Uruguay’s Christian
Democratic Party is now represented in both the FA and NE coalitions,
it is insignificant in electoral terms.
The secular nature of the FA has granted the coalition leeway in pursuing policies that recognize the changing nature of the family and
women’s roles in society. Indeed, the party group appears more willing
to create policy that intervenes in the private sphere of the home. Since
the FA only recently won the presidency, it is difficult to test this proposition, but the party platform reveals the FA’s willingness to break with
traditional conceptions of women and the family. For example, the platform names female-headed households as its primary “social risk”
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focus group (Encuentro Progresista 1999, 21). Additionally, the FA created a special section of policies for women, which focused primarily on
boosting female labor market participation and increasing women’s financial autonomy (Encuentro Progresista 1999, 40).
In summary, differences in women’s entry into the labor market in
Chile and Uruguay shaped the gendered power distribution in both
countries by providing women with divergent political and organizational resources. The character of each state’s party system also provided
opportunities for (in the case of Uruguay) and constrained (in the case
of Chile) women’s ability to mobilize demands through political organizations. These differences in women’s mobilizing capacity, in turn,
affected the character of social policy. As policies took hold, a virtuous
cycle was created in Uruguay: women entered the labor force and began to be mobilized through unions and parties. This mobilization helped
achieve more gender-friendly policies, which further increased women’s
labor force participation. Such a cycle did not play out in Chile, where
females joined the work force at a slower pace and tended to mobilize
interests outside of the political sphere.
These initial gendered differences between Chile and Uruguay further widened following both countries’ experiences under military rule.
In the case of Chile, the Pinochet government’s strict adoption of
neoliberal economic and social policies dramatically altered the country’s
social structure, concentrating high levels of wealth and political power
among a small, elite group. As inequality grew, divisions emerged within
the women’s movement. These divisions hindered (and continue to affect) the ability of women’s groups to mobilize unified demands for more
equitable social policy (Blofield 2006). In addition to growth in poverty
and inequality, other aspects of the Pinochet government’s neoliberal
reform process, namely the creation of a two-tiered labor market and
the privatization of health and social security services, undermined the
coherence of gendered social policy demands. This is because women
were divided into contract workers and boleta workers, and private
healthcare users and public healthcare users. These divisions altered the
character of women’s demands and greatly reduced the perception of
shared fate.
Additionally, by providing special protections to the right, Chile’s
military regime strengthened ideological constraints that limit gender-friendly social policy development. The military-era constitution
strengthened the parties of the right by instituting an electoral system that favors minority parties and by providing for senators for
life. Finally, the close cooperation between pro-democracy forces and
Church actors during the Chilean transition also ensured an important political role for the traditional Catholic Church in posttransition politics (Htun 2003). In Uruguay, the military regime was
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unable to dismantle the country’s welfare state, the political right was
discredited, and the Church continues to be a relatively unimportant
actor in national politics.
COMPETING THEORIES

One beneficial aspect of selecting Chile and Uruguay as cases for
analysis is that it allows me to control for a number of potential explanatory variables, thereby eliminating several rival hypotheses. Indeed, the fact that Chile and Uruguay exhibit similar levels of economic
development suggests that the gendered character of a country’s welfare state is not solely determined by national income. Similarly, the
fact that both countries have a long experience with democracy and
exhibit stable party systems underscores the fact that gendered differences can and do exist in settings of highly institutionalized and democratic politics.
Several other competing theories cannot be ruled out without a closer
examination. One rival explanation that seems plausible at first glance
is political culture. Indeed, the observed variation in Chile’s and
Uruguay’s gendered social policy regimes might simply be the result of
Chile’s conservative culture and Uruguay’s more liberal character. I
maintain, however, that the countries’ political cultures can be unpacked
into more clearly defined variables for this analysis. Specifically, Chile’s
conservative cultural attitudes about women’s roles must be understood
in the context of strong and institutionalized rightist parties and the
Catholic Church. For this reason, I analyze the right and the Church,
thereby attempting to operationalize the country’s cultural conservativism. In this way, I seek to uncover how culture is produced and
reproduced in Chile and Uruguay. By approaching the issue of culture
from this angle, I avoid problems that arise in attempting to define and
measure a concept as tenuous as culture.
Other critics might argue that the theory presented here is more complex than it needs to be. They may contend that historical differences in
female labor force participation, women’s mobilization, and the character of the party system are not important for contemporary gendered
variation between Chile and Uruguay. Rather, they may argue that the
legacy of each country’s military regime can sufficiently explain crossnational gendered differences in social policy. This assertion, however,
does not hold up when confronted with historical data. Indeed, important gendered differences already existed between Chile and Uruguay
prior to each state’s authoritarian period. Thus, while the Pinochet regime did exacerbate differences between the two countries, it does not
sufficiently explain the variation between the cases.
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CONCLUSION

In this article I seek to explain gendered differences in Chile’s and
Uruguay’s welfare regimes through an analysis of three policy sectors:
family allowances, maternity leave, and childcare. The policy evaluation reveals that Chile’s social policy regime is a very strong breadwinner model, while Uruguay’s policies are a weaker version of the
breadwinner type. I find that the gendered differences in Chile’s and
Uruguay’s welfare policies result from a two-part process that involves
the interaction of female labor force participation, women’s mobilization, party system characteristics, policy legacies, and the impact of each
country’s military regime. The theory presented here (one of “virtuous”
and “disadvantageous” cycles) does not imply that change is impossible in Chile and Uruguay, but rather that the possibilities for progressive gendered social policy reform are heavily conditioned by historical
legacies. It is interesting to note, however, the theory specified in this
paper suggests that two recent developments in Chile and Uruguay could
have important gendered consequences in the medium to long term.
First, recent increases in the levels of poverty and in the size of Uruguay’s
informal sector may influence (in a negative manner) women’s mobilization and the cross-class nature of gendered social policy formation in
that country. In Chile, by contrast, the election of a female president
(Michelle Bachelet) may provide an opening within the center-left alliance for the mobilization of women’s demands. Both of these developments can be understood and integrated into the explanation presented
in this paper.
The findings presented in this article have several interesting implications. The study is one of the first research projects to probe the question of how and why Latin American welfare states vary with regard to
the protection of women’s social rights. Indeed, previous research on
Latin American social policy has focused on the overall character of social protection, thereby neglecting the existence of important gendered
differences in the region’s welfare policy. In this respect, the analysis of
Chile provides special insight. Since the return to democracy, Chile’s
Concertación governments have invested significant political and economic resources in expanding social welfare programs. The result has
been a tremendous reduction in overall poverty, from 38.6 percent in
1990 to 20.6 percent in 2000 (ECLAC 2002, 211, 223). This rapid decrease
was not matched, however, for female-headed households living in poverty. Indeed, while overall poverty decreased 18 percentage points between 1990 and 2000, the share of female-headed households living in
poverty decreased only 9.8 percent. It is interesting, then, that although
an analysis of Chile’s general welfare regime might conclude that
public policy has been extremely effective at addressing poverty,
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improvements in welfare have not been equally distributed across society. This difference suggests a new arena for future research on Latin
American political economy.
In addition to gendered differences in the provision of social rights,
this paper highlights significant variation in the overall organization of
Latin American welfare states. The fact that cross-national differences in
social policy exist in Latin America is significant because it suggests that
the conclusions of some analysts, that Latin America has entered a uniform “race to the bottom” with respect to social policy, may be premature. Rather, the evidence presented here suggests that Latin American
welfare regimes vary in significant and systematic ways. Furthermore,
the fact that sizable differences exist between Chile’s and Uruguay’s
welfare policies suggests that there is room within the open-market economic model for different degrees of social protection. Indeed, despite
Uruguay’s high level of economic openness, the country offers greater
protection to women than Chile, also an extremely open country. This
lends support to the argument advanced by Huber and Solt (2004) that
assessments of neoliberal economic reforms in the region should analyze the character and speed of the reform process rather than considering the simple dichotomy of “reformers” and “nonreformers.” To better
understand the consequences of neoliberal reforms for women’s wellbeing, future studies of gender and social policy should consider whether
variation in the speed and timing of reforms influences the quality of
women’s social rights and the possibility for subsequent progressive
gendered policy reform.
This paper also has implications for studies of women’s mobilization
and feminist movements. One of the current debates in the field of
women’s politics has to do with the issue of whether or not strong ties
between feminist groups and state organizations can serve the interests
of women. Put differently, the debate is about autonomy versus partnership.20 The findings presented here suggest that cooperation between
women’s groups and traditional political and state actors can have beneficial outcomes for women. Specifically, in Uruguay the fact that women
mobilized within unions and parties helped feminist groups channel
demands into the policy-making arena. In Chile, by contrast, the distance between feminist organizations and state actors appears to have
undermined the ability of many groups to have their voices heard in the
policy-making process.
Clearly, then, this is a topic that deserves further research. The differences highlighted in this analysis of three policy sectors suggest that
future studies should consider whether similar gendered variation

20. For a discussion of this issue in Chile see Baldez (2002) and Ríos Tobar (2004).
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exists in health, education, and pension policy and if such differences
exist in other countries as well.21 There is also a need for scholars to
construct analytic frameworks that correspond to the unique aspects of
Latin American social policy regimes. Indeed, while the use of
Sainsbury’s (1996) framework is functional, a great deal more may be
learned by including dimensions that are particularly relevant in Latin
American social policy making, such as the presence of a large informal
sector and low levels of industrial employment. Hite and Viterna’s (2005)
analysis of gender and class in Latin America provides an excellent base
for the creation of such a framework. The authors track recent changes
in the Latin American class structure, paying special attention to
gendered stratification. Their findings about the impact of women’s increased labor force participation on the strength of the working class
shed new light on the dynamics of change in Latin America’s social policy
regimes.
The formation of this and other such frameworks that consider questions of gender and welfare in Latin America would benefit all scholars
of political economy, not just those who research the region. Indeed, as
Madrid (2003) points out in his study of pension privatization in Latin
America, research on comparative welfare states has evolved quickly
during the past twenty years, but it has been based predominantly on
studies of advanced industrial democracies. Expanding this research to
include Latin American cases would provide a new and important field
for testing extant theories.

21. See Arenas de Mesa and Montecinos (1999) for findings on the gendered impact of
pension privatization.
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